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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of institutional quality in the external debt–economic
growth relationship. By taking a dynamic threshold specification to a panel data
consisting of 53 countries, we find that external debt has an adverse effect on a country’s
growth, while institutional quality improves it. We find that the effect of external debt
on economic growth depends on the level of institutional quality. In addition, at a
high level of external debt, the effect of institutional quality on growth is very small,
suggesting that the adverse effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth
holds true.
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I. INTRODUCTION
External debt is an important initiative for capital formation in the Solow growth
model, which explained why countries borrow from abroad (Villaneuva, 2003;
Otani and Villanueva, 1989). The early work of Griffin and Enos (1970) highlighted
that external debt may enhance economic growth only to a certain point. Global
debt (both public and private) has reached an all-time high, while emerging market
public debt is at levels last seen during the 1980s debt crisis and low-income
countries are experiencing a sharp increase in their debt burden (IMF, 2019). This
high debt burden potentially represents a risk to economies having implications
for financial stability and crowding out investment.
However, to-date, there is a lack of consensus in the literature on the effect of
external debt on a country’s economic growth. There is a considerable literature
supporting a negative effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth
(Cordella et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2011; Ramzan and Ahmad, 2014; Daud and
Podivinsky, 2012; Pattillo et al., 2004; Chowdhury, 2001; Sen et al., 2007).1 In
contrast, Pattillo et al. (2002, 2004), Cordella et al. (2010), and Imbs and Ranciere
(2005) find that the effect of external debt on growth is positive up to a certain limit
of external debt.
Thus, no clear consensus exists on the relationship between external debt and
economic growth. Despite this lack of consensus, managing debt is critical, since
it also involves risks and costs, and paying-off debt simultaneously. Seminal work
on the sources of growth, including the Solow model, and the endogenous growth
model and its extensions, assume that distributive policies and institutional quality
are in place for income to converge (Law et al., 2018; Daud and Podivinsky, 2014;
Law et al., 2013). Relevant institutions playing their role in the regulatory framework
could lower the probability of a debt overhang (Imbs and Ranciere, 2005). The
challenges one might highlight in debt initiatives are the quality of the political
environment, government legislation, institutional framework, and delivery of
basic services (IMF, 2013).2 In addition, Pattillo et al. (2004) explained that the main
channel through which debt affects economic growth is the quality and efficiency
of investment rather than its level. Meanwhile, the quantity and productivity of
inputs, be they capital or labor, will be influenced by the institutional environment
(Gwartney et al., 2004). One might wonder whether or not the environment and
the institutions, including economic freedom, complement the impact of debt on
economic growth.3 This could be translated to the potentially important factors
explaining the adverse effect of debt on growth, which could be summed up as
the quality of policy and institutions. On the other hand, the institutional quality
1

2

3

The adverse effect of external debt on growth may be related to debt overhang and the crowding-out
effects, whereby external debts are excessively high and associated with a low ability. A high debt
levels are likely to discourage of foreign investment.
One important lesson learned from the recent global financial crisis 2007–2008 is that prudent
macroeconomic policies should be supported by a political environment and relevant government
legislation conducive to boosting the domestic economy (UNECA, 2012). In addition, Alfaro et al.
(2004) point out the importance of local conditions (such as expropriation risk) in facilitating the
effect of capital flows to a country.
There are studies showing a positive relationship between economic freedom and growth (see, e.g.,
Gwartney et al., 2004; Dawson, 2003; Heckelman and Stroup, 2000; Heckelman, 2000).
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of a country has a significant and positive effect on the level of long-term debt on
a firm’s financial structure, thus suggesting that it is an important determinant of
corporate financing and debt maturity (Kirch et al., 2012).
Research in this area has started to investigate the role played by institutional
quality on the effect of external debt on growth (Mensah et al., 2018; Cordella et
al., 2010; Imbs and Ranciere, 2005). Focusing on highly indebted countries over
the period from 1970 to 2002, Cordella et al., (2010) find that countries with good
policies and institutions still experience negative effects of external debt (a strong
debt overhang position), if countries held debt in excess of 25% of gross domestic
product (GDP). In a country with bad policies, the debt threshold is lower, but the
evidence of debt overhang is weaker (Cordella et al., 2010). Thus, no conclusion
can be made regarding the external debt–economic growth nexus using this study.
Meanwhile, Imbs and Ranciere (2005) find that a debt overhang is less likely to
occur with more effective governance and within a better legal and contractual
environment. However, a debt overhang might still happen at a higher level of
indebtedness. A recent study by Mensah et al. (2018), in the context of 36 SubSaharan African countries, supports the existing evidence that the impact of
external debt on growth is through countries’ institutional quality, but only up
to a point. In other words, when a country is on the wrong side of the debt Laffer
curve, external debt and institutional quality becomes irrelevant (Mensah et al.,
2018). However, the paper does not suggest the cut-off of debt on the debt Laffer
curve.
Table 1 provides a summary of previous literature on the role of institutional
quality in the debt–growth relationship. Hypothetically, good institutional quality
would act as an accelerator to growth. In addition, the quality of institutions may
impact the effect of debt on growth through the efficient allocation and responsible
use of debt. As such, this paper extends prior studies by covering a large group
of countries comprised of a longer sample period. We use a robust estimation
method that sheds lights on the role of institutional quality in the effect of external
debt on a country’s growth and the optimal level of external debt a country should
hold. Although several studies investigate the effect of foreign investment flow
on growth, little attention is paid to the effect of external debt and institutional
quality on growth. We make small but important contributions to the external
debt–growth literature by investigating the effect of external debt on growth
conditional on institutional quality. The recent rise in global uncertainty and
the associated disruptions in economic activity, following the novel coronavirus
outbreak, highlight the importance of understanding the sources of growth in
order to better optimize growth policies.4 Countries completely locked down to
minimize the spread of the coronavirus (see Iyke, 2020a; Phan and Narayan, 2020),
which would worsen their ability to service their debts and potentially harm their
ability to borrow in the future to invest in growth-oriented projects. In this regard,
understanding the impact of external debt on growth is important. In addition, we
4

A growing number of studies show the novel coronavirus outbreak made markets very volatile
and disrupted global economic activity in various ways (see, e.g., Devpura and Narayan, 2020; Fu
and Shen, 2020; Haroon and Rizvi, 2020; Iyke, 2020a,b; Mishra et al., 2020; Narayan, 2020; Phan and
Narayan, 2020; Prabheesh et al., 2020; Salisu and Adediran, 2020; Salisu and and Akanni, 2020; Vidya
and Prabheesh, 2020).
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extend the literature by employing the dynamic panel threshold regression method
of Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the non-linear relationship between external debt
and economic growth, and we estimate the threshold values of external debt and
institutional quality on economic growth.
Table 1.
Summary of the Studies Between External Debt, Institutional Quality, and
Economic Growth
This table present the current literature that investigate the relationship between external debt, institutional quality
and economic growth.

Authors
Cordella et
al., (2010)

Imbs and
Ranciere
(2005)

Sample
countries

Type of data
and sample
period

79 developing
countries

87 low and
middle
income
countries.

Methods

Findings

Panel data
(1970-2002)

SystemGeneralized
methods of
moments

The quality of institutions matters
to the external debt-growth
relationship depending on the level
of external debt. Countries with
good policies and institutions face
overhang when NPV of external
debt rises above 20–25 percent of
GDP, while in countries with bad
policies and institutions, overhang
and irrelevance thresholds seem to
be substantially lower (10–15 and
15–35 percent of GDP, respectively).

Panel data
(1969-2002)

SystemGeneralized
methods of
moments

Institutions matter in the external
debt-growth relationship.
Government effectiveness, the rule
of law and bureaucratic quality
correlate positively with economic
growth and tend to limit external
debt build-up.
In addition, external debt overhang
occurs when the face value of
external debt reaches 55 to 60
percent of GDP or 200 percent of
exports, or when the present value
of external debt reaches 35 to 40
percent of GDP or 140 percent of
exports. However, external debt
overhang may still happen in
economies endowed with good
institutions, but for higher values of
external debt.

Mensah et al.
(2018b)

36 SubSaharan
Africa

Panel data
(1996-2013)
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SystemGeneralized
methods of
moments

The results from the system-GMM
found that institutional quality
has robust effects on the external
debt–growth nexus. However, the
mediating effect of institutional
quality on this nexus is up to an
optimal level of the external debtLaffer curve.
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Based on a panel data consisting of 53 countries over the period of 2005-2016,
we show that external debt has an adverse effect on a country’s growth, while
institutional quality improves it. We show that the coefficient of the interaction
between external debt and institutional quality is statistically significant with
a negative sign, implying that the effect of external debt on economic growth
depends on the level of institutional quality. In addition, at a high level of external
debt, the effect of institutional quality on growth is very small, suggesting that the
adverse effect of external debt on a country’s economic growth holds true.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section reviews the data and
methodology. Section III presents the empirical results, while Section IV concludes
the paper.
II. MODEL, METHODOLOGY AND DATA
This paper follows the standard growth literature to investigate the external debt–
growth relationship by specifying the empirical model as:
(1)
where
is economic growth measured as the growth rate in GDP per
capita, EDit is country i’s external debt level, Xit is a vector of control variables
used in the growth literature, namely initial income, investment-gross domestic
product ratio, population growth rates, trade, and institutional quality (see
Cordella et al., 2010; Iyke, 2017, 2018; Takumah and Iyke, 2017; Juhro et al., 2020;
Ho and Iyke, 2020), eit is the error term, i = 1,...N is the country identifier, and
t = 1,...T is the time identifier. The institutional quality indicator is measured
using the country external debt policy, economic management cluster, and
macroeconomic management indicators published by the World Bank, which
are developed to assess the quality of a country’s present policy and institutional
framework. For each criterion, countries are rated on a scale of 1 to 6, such that
a 1-rating implies a very weak performance and a 6-rating implies a very strong
performance. The Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) consists of
16 criteria, which are grouped into four clusters. This paper focuses on one of the
CPIA clusters, namely economic management. The economic management cluster
includes macroeconomic management, fiscal policy, and debt policy. The debt
policy management assesses whether the external debt management strategy is
conducive to minimizing budgetary risks and ensuring long-term external debt
sustainability. Macroeconomic management assesses the monetary, exchange
rate, and aggregate demand policy frameworks. We choose this cluster because
the quality of economic management would possibly affect the role played by
external debt on a country’s growth, since external debt consists of a government’s
external debt. In addition, economic management plays a role in facilitating the
business eco-system, thus enhancing the efficiency or productivity of external debt.
Investment ratio and population growth represent physical and human capital
accumulation, respectively.5 The model used to estimate the impact of institutional
quality on the external debt–growth relationship is as follows:
5

A list of countries is presented in Appendix 1.
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(2)
where mi, qt, and eit represent the country-specific effect, time effect, and the
white-noise error term. The coefficient associated with β3 captures the effect
of institutions on the external debt–growth relationship. In other words, the
interaction variable, EDit * IQit, captures the idea that institutional factors may
explain the variation in the external debt–growth nexus.6
We employed the system Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator
proposed by Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) to estimate Eq. (2). A general dynamic panel
model for country i at time t is:
(3)
where ji is the vector of country effect, Xit is an N x p matrix of p explanatory
variables, and eit is the error term, which is assumed to be normally distributed. A
common approach to estimating a dynamic panel data model in the first difference
GMM estimator, which was proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991), and can be
formulated as:
(4)
The idea of this estimator is to take the first differences of the variables in order
to eliminate the source of inconsistency (i.e. the country-specific effect ji ,), and use
the levels of the explanatory variables lagged at least two periods as instruments
(see Arellano and Bond, 1991). For the first difference GMM estimators to be
consistent, we must assume that the errors are not second-order serially correlated
and that explanatory variables are weakly exogenous. However, Blundell and
Bond (1998) pointed out that when explanatory variables are persistent, the
lagged levels of the explanatory variables are weak instruments for the variables
in differences. They showed that, in a small sample, the shortcomings of weak
instruments translate into a large finite sample bias. By adding (3) into the original
equation (4), a level of a system of equations that also include variables in the first
differences, the system GMM estimator is particularly useful in controlling for
country-specific effects. Additionally, the system GMM estimator preserves the
cross-country dimension of the data that is lost when only the first differenced
equation is estimated (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In the system GMM estimator, the equations in the first differences eliminate
the fixed effects in the model. Moreover, the difference equations are combined
with equations in levels, which are instrumented with the lagged first differences
of the corresponding explanatory variable. In other words, the system GMM
estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of all explanatory variables by
using the instrumental variables. In order to use these additional instruments,
we need the identifying assumption that the first difference of the explanatory
variables is not correlated with the explanatory variables; the correlation is
supposed to be constant over time. If the moment conditions are valid, Blundell
6

However, our model and number of countries are constrained by the data unavailiability.
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and Bond (1998) showed, in Monte Carlo simulations, that the system GMM
estimator performs better than the first difference GMM estimator. We can test
the validity of the moment conditions by using the conventional test of overidentifying restrictions proposed by Sargan (1958), testing the null hypothesis to
verify that the error term is not second-order serially correlated. The system GMM
estimator has several advantages when estimating the growth model. By taking
the first difference approach to remove the unobserved time-invariant, countryspecific effects, the system GMM estimator eliminates omitted variable bias that
are constant over time (Bond et al., 2001). In addition, the use of instrumental
variables allows the parameters to be consistently estimated, which eliminates the
potential endogeneity problem as well as measurement errors.
We carried out robustness checks to examine the sensitivity of our results to
additional estimation strategies and methods. We employed the dynamic panel
threshold regression method by Kremer et al. (2013) to explore the non-linear
relationship between external debt and economic growth. In addition, we used
this method to estimate the threshold values of external debt and institutional.
Kremer et al. (2013) extended Hansen’s (1999) static panel threshold estimation
and Caner and Hansen’s (2004) cross-sectional instrumental variable (IV) threshold
model, using a GMM-type estimator to control for endogeneity. The threshold
regression model is as follows:
(5)
where ED is the threshold variable and l is the unknown threshold parameter.
In the following model IQ is the threshold variable:
(6)
I() is the indicator function, which takes the value 1 if the argument in
parenthesis is valid and 0 otherwise. This allows the role of external debt on a
country’s economic growth to differ depending on whether ED or IQ is below or
above some unknown level of l. The impact of external debt on growth is captured
by b1 and b2 for low and high regimes, respectively. This method allows for a
difference in regime intercept (d1).
We estimate Eq. (6) using the least squares estimator for a fixed threshold l,
where the endogenous variables are replaced by the predicted values in the reduced
form regression. We then choose the threshold value l based on the smallest sum
of squared residuals. After estimating the threshold value , we estimate the slope
coefficient using the GMM estimator. The critical values for determining the 95
percent confidence interval of the threshold value are given by:

where C(a) is the 95 percentiles of the asymptotic distribution of the likelihood
ratio statistics LR(l) Data are collected from various sources, including the World
Development Indicators (WDI) and Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
Published by Bulletin of Monetary Economics and Banking, 2020
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(CPIA) databases hosted by the World Bank. The sample consists of 53 countries
and covers the period from 2005 to 2016.7
III. RESULTS
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics on the variables over the period of 2005 to
2016. The information derived from the descriptive statistics provides an overview
of a country’s position in the sample. The average growth rate of GDP per capita
shows is 3.04% with a standard deviation of 3.46%. Meanwhile, the average external
debt per Gross National Income (GNI) is approximately 43.37. The averages
of the three institutional quality in indicators (external debt policy, economic
management cluster, and macroeconomics management) are, respectively, 3.62,
3.65, and 3.81. Since institutional quality is measured such that 1 and 6 imply low
and high institutional quality, respectively, this means, on average, institutional
quality is moderatein these countries.
Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2016
This table present descriptive statistics (namely, mean, standard deviation (SD), minimum (min.) and maximum
(max.) values) for the 2005-2016 period. The variables noted in column 1 are growth rate of GDP per capita, initial
income, investment, population, trade, external debt and institutional indicators (namely, external debt policy,
economic management and economic management cluster). In addition, the measurement and source of the data are
displayed in the last two columns.

Variables
(abbreviation)

SD

Min.

Max.

Measurement

3.04

3.64

-22.23

18.00

Annual percentage
growth rate gross
domestic product per
capita in constant 2010
U.S. dollars.

WDI,
World
Bank

1484.67

1313.78

218.28

8221.77

Lagged of gross domestic
product per capita
in constant 2010 U.S.
dollars.

WDI,
World
Bank

Investment

24.64

8.67

5.46

68.02

Gross capital formation
as percentage of GDP

WDI,
World
Bank

Population Growth

2.04

1.07

-1.32

3.94

Annual growth (in
percent)

WDI,
World
Bank

Trade

78.87

32.15

19.10

203.83

As percentage of GDP

WDI,
World
Bank

External Debt (ED)

43.37

29.38

1.98

231.99

As percentage of GNI

WDI,
World
Bank

Growth Rate of GDP per
Capita (GROWTH)

Initial Income

7

Source of
data

Mean

Data on governance indicators are only available for the year 2005 onwards. Due to short sample
size, the analysis is based on non-averaged 5-year data, as is the usual approach conducted in growth
literature.
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Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics, 2005-2016 (Continued)
Variables
(abbreviation)

Mean

SD

Min.

Max.

Measurement

Source of
data

Institutional Quality Indicator (IQ)
External Debt Policy

3.62

0.78

1

6

1 = low quality,
6= high quality

CPIA,
World
Bank

Economic Management
Cluster

3.65

0.58

1.83

5.5

1 = low,
6 = high

CPIA,
World
Bank

Macroeconomic
Management

3.81

0.55

2

5.5

1 = low,
6 = high

CPIA,
World
Bank

Over the period 2005 to 2016 on average, countries held more than 50% of their
external debt in the form of public external debt, thus highlighting the importance of
analyzing the role of institutional quality in the external debt–growth relationship.
That is, at high levels of external debt holding, does institutional quality matter?
Figure 1 shows a scatter diagram of external debt versus GDP per capita growth
for the 53 countries using data averages from 2005 to 2016. Countries that hold
over 60% (of GNI) as external debt, such as the Republic of Congo and Gambia,
experience less than 2% in GDP per capita growth. Meanwhile, Bhutan, Georgia,
Lao PDR, and Mongolia are among those countries that hold an external debt of
more than 60% of GNI and are associated with a high GDP per capita growth (i.e.
they experienced, at least, 6% of growth). Thus, having a higher debt is associated
with higher growth for most countries in our sample. This could highlight possible
benefits for the countries holding external debt.
The results on the effects of external debt and institutional on a country’s
growth are shown in Table 3. Our analysis starts by examining the impact of
external debt on growth, as shown in column 2 (Model 1a). The results reveal that
external debt has a negative impact on growth, which is consistent with previous
studies (Cordella et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2011; Ramzan and Ahmad, 2014; Daud
and Podivinsky, 2012; Choong et al., 2010; Pattillo et al., 2004; Chowdhury, 2001;
Sen et al., 2007). Considering the other three models (i.e. Models b, c, and d), the
slope coefficient on external debt is statistically significant and is in the 0.07 to 0.08
range, suggesting a decline in growth of at least 0.07% for a percentage change in
external debt. The control variables show the correct signs and are significant at
the 5% significance level, at least. In addition, the main model could not reject the
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation at the 5% significance level,
at least. Besides that, the p-value of 0.90 generated by the Sargan test suggests
that we could not reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction for
the estimation. This shows that the instrument variables in our system GMM
estimations are valid.
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Figure 1.
External Debt Versus GDP per Capita Growth
The figure plots a scatter diagram of external debt versus GDP per capita growth for 53 countries using data averages
from 2005 to 2016.

Uzbekistan

Georgia

6

India

Cambodia

Rwanda VietnamSri Lanka
Armenia
Bangladesh
Afghanistan
Sudan Tajikistan

RGDPPCG

4

GhanaMozambique

0

2

Nigeria

Lao PDR

Bhutan

Mongolia

Moldova

Guyana
Tanzania
Kosovo
Bolivia
Lesotho
Uganda
Nicaragua
Dem. Rep.Cabo Verde
Nepal Congo,
Burkina
Faso Sierra Leone
Kenya

Kyrgyz Republic

Malawi
Cote d'IvoireMauritania
Pakistan
Honduras
Niger
Chad
Cameroon
Congo, Rep.
Senegal
Togo
BeninMali
Vanuatu
St. Lucia
Haiti
Madagascar
Burundi Gambia, The
Comoros

0

50
EDGNI

100

Table 3.
Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and
Economic Growth
This table shows the relationship between external debt, institutional quality and economic growth. The baseline
results on the effect of external on country economic growth is present in column 2 (model 1a). In addition, model 1b,
1c and 1d present the results of debt-growth model with the inclusion of institutional quality variable namely external
debt policy, economic management cluster and macroeconomic management respectively. Notes: ***, ** and * denote
significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Statistics in parenthesis denote the t-statistics.

GROWTH

Initial income
Investment
Population growth

Model 1a

Model 1b

Model 1c

Model 1d

Main model

Institutional
indicator:
External debt
policy

Institutional
indicator:
Economic
management
cluster

Institutional
indicator:
Macroeconomic
management

0.00***

0.00***

0.00***

0.00***

(18.74)

(15.75)

(15.80)

(16.94)

0.09***

0.08***

0.08***

0.08***

(11.75)

(13.59)

(8.52)

(9.12)

0.84***

1.67***

1.75***

1.09***

(6.76)

(9.62)

(7.92)

(7.55)
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Table 3.
Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and
Economic Growth (Continued)
GROWTH

Model 1a

Model 1b

Model 1c

Model 1d

Main model

Institutional
indicator:
External debt
policy

Institutional
indicator:
Economic
management
cluster

Institutional
indicator:
Macroeconomic
management

Trade

0.06***

0.04***

0.05***

0.05***

(18.22)

(9.48)

(8.17)

(11.73)

ED

-0.08***

-0.07***

-0.07***

-0.08***

(20.26)

(22.02)

(18.49)

2.05***

2.05***

0.61***

(21.24)
IQ
Constant

(6.59)

(9.80)

(4.66)

-5.57***

-13.86***

-14.65***

-8.02***

(11.18)

(11.76)

(13.28)

10.70)

AR(2) test (p-value)

0.58

0.54

0.57

0.56

Sargan test (p-value)

0.90

0.90

0.93

0.91

A negative effect of external debt on growth, as reported in recent and previous
studies leads to the possible existence of a contingency effect of external debt on
economic growth. Before analyzing the contingency effect of institutions on the
effect of external debt on economic growth, we analyze the effect of institutions on
growth and report the results in columns 2 to 4 of Table 3 (i.e., we estimate Models
1b, c, and d, respectively). The three institutional quality variables have a positive
and statistically significant impact on economic growth, meaning that institutions
positively contribute to economic growth, which is consistent with several studies
(see, e.g., Mensah et al., 2018; Cordella et al., 2010; Presbitero, 2008; Imbs and
Ranciere, 2005). However, with the inclusion of the institutional indicator in the
external debt–growth nexus specification, external debt consistently contributed
negatively and significantly to growth, at least, at the 5% significance level (i.e.
Models 1b, c, and d), based on the p-values, we could not reject the null of no
second-order serial correlation for the AR(2) test for these models. The Sargan
test also could not reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction,
suggesting that the instruments are valid.
We further extended our analysis to consider the contingency effect of
institutional quality on the external debt–growth nexus. Intuitively, since external
debt also involved equal representation of private and government borrowing,
institutional quality matters in ensuring the efficient allocation and distributions
of debt to targeted sectors and specifically formulated policies. We follow Mensah
et al.’s (2018) approach and report our results in Table 4. The results show that
the interaction terms between external debt and the institutional quality variables
are significant at the 5% significance level, implying that the effect of external
debt on economic growth depends on the level of institutional quality. However,
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the negative sign of the interaction terms would lead to the argument regarding
why external debt affects a country’s economic growth negatively as institutional
quality improved.
Table 4.
Results on GMM-System Estimation on External Debt, Institutional Quality and
Economic Growth (Interaction Between Institutional Indicator and External Debt
Variable)
This table present results of the interaction between institutional quality variable and external debt variable. Notes:
***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5% and 10%. Statistics in parenthesis denote the t-statistics.

GROWTH

Initial Income
Investment
Population Growth
Trade
ED
IQ

Model 2a

Model 2b

Model 2c

Institutional
indicator: External
debt policy

Institutional
indicator: Economic
management cluster

Institutional
indicator:
Macroeconomic
management

0.00***

0.00***

0.00***

(19.99)

(22.38)

(9.61)

0.08***

0.09***

0.09***

(10.95)

(12.12)

(13.29)

1.58**

1.74***

1.14***

(6.54)

(6.03)

(4.69)

0.05***

0.05***

0.06***

(9.79)

(10.95)

(8.25)

0.01

0.06***

0.08***

(1.26)

(4.26)

(6.28)

3.00

3.71***

2.46***

(12.64)

(10.73)

(14.31

ED*IQ

-0.03***

-0.04***

-0.04***

(8.27)

(9.80)

(10.80)

Constant

-17.25***

-20.59***

-15.59

(15.70)

(12.28)

(14.80)

AR(2) test (p-value)

0.53

0.54

0.59

Sargan test (p-value)

0.95

0.95

0.94

The other explanatory variables show a consistent effect on economic growth
at the 5% significance level. The p-values for the serial correlation test suggest that
we could not reject the null of no second-order serial correlation. The Sargan test
also fails to reject the null hypothesis of no over-identifying restriction, suggesting
that the instruments are valid.
To further investigate the negative effect of the interaction term (i.e. interaction
between external debt and institutional quality), we explore possible threshold
levels of external debt and institutional quality using a dynamic panel threshold
regression. Table 5 shows the results using the three institutional indicators. In
Model 3a, where the external debt is a threshold variable, the threshold level of
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external debt as a percentage of GNI is 46.56% with a 95% confidence interval
of [29.28, 54.45]. External debt has an insignificant effect on growth below the
threshold value (see Panel B of Table 5). However, the effect of external debt
on economic growth becomes negative after this threshold value is surpassed.
By carefully looking at our data, we observed that external debt surpassed the
threshold of 46.56% in 214 out of the 636 periods (t). Armenia, Burundi, Bhutan,
Bolivia, Comoros, Congo, Democrat Republic, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Congo
Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Guyana, Georgia, Ghana, Gambia, Kyrgyz Republic,
Lao, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Mauritania, Moldova, Mongolia,
Nicaragua, Niger, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tajikistan, St. Lucia,
Togo, Uganda, and Vanuatu experienced, at least, one period where external debt
holding surpassed the threshold level. Meanwhile, for Models 3b, 3c, and 3d, where
the institutional quality indicator is the threshold variable, the threshold value lies
within 3 to 4.5 index points. Since institutional quality is defined such that 1 and 6
denote, respectively, low and high institutional quality, the threshold values imply
that below 3 and above 4.5 denote, respectively, low and high institutional quality.
The impact of external debt on growth is negative but insignificant when
institutional quality threshold is below 3.00, while the effect becomes significant
above this threshold(see Models 3b and 3d, and Model 3c), thus suggesting that
the negative effect of external debt on economic growth is non-monotonic, since it
depends on the level of institutional quality. In other words, as institutional quality
improves, the negative effect of external debt on growth becomes important,
consistent with Cordella et al. (2010), who found that countries with good policies
and institutions still experience the negative effect of external debt as the debt level
rises above 25% of GDP. Unlike Cordella et al. (2010), we find that the negative
effect of external debt sets in when external debt exceed 45.56% of GNI.
Table 5.
Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation with External Debt and
Institutional Quality Indicators as A Threshold Variable
This table shows the robustness test of the external debt and institutional quality on economic growth by employing
the dynamic panel threshold estimates. Notes: ***, ** and * denote significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%. Statistics in
parenthesis denote the t-statistics.

Panel A: Threshold variable

Threshold estimates,
95% confidence interval

Model 3a

Model 3b

Model 3c

Model 3d

External debt to
GNI

Institutional
indicator:
External debt
policy

Institutional
indicator:
Economic
management
cluster

Institutional
indicator:
Macroeconomic
management

46.56

4.50

3.00

4.50

[29.28,54.45]

[4.50,4.50]

[3.00,3.33]

[3.00,4.50]

-0.00

-0.02**

Panel B: Impact of external debt on growth
0.02

-0.02**

(0.61)

(2.29)

(0.36)

(4.34)

-0.01**

-0.18**

-0.03**

-0.42

(3.05)

(4.37)

(3.21)

(1.53)
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Table 5.
Results of Dynamic Panel Threshold Estimation with External Debt and
Institutional Quality Indicators as A Threshold Variable (Continued)
Panel A: Threshold variable

Model 3a

Model 3b

Model 3c

Model 3d

External debt to
GNI

Institutional
indicator:
External debt
policy

Institutional
indicator:
Economic
management
cluster

Institutional
indicator:
Macroeconomic
management

Panel C: Impact of covariates
Initial income it-1
Investment it
Population growth it
Trade it

-6.38**

-4.71**

-4.67**

-5.55**

(4.59)

(3.54)

(3.22)

(4.32)

0.08**

0.07**

0.07*

0.08**

(2.09)

(1.97)

(1.72)

(2.11)

0.50

0.91

0.24

0.39

(0.69)

(1.49)

(0.33)

(0.68)
0.02**

0.02

0.03**

0.02*

(1.39)

(2.07)

(1.71)

(1.85)

0.91

-8.86**

-3.16**

-15.27*

(0.66)

(2.08)

(2.92)

(1.67)

IV. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we examine the effect of institutional quality and external debt on
economic growth, while controlling for the traditional determinants of growth.
An important way our work is different from the literature is that we estimate
and model the threshold level of debt required for an economy to optimize the
effect of debt on growth. We add to this analysis a search for the threshold level of
institutional quality. We examine the way external debt and institutions interact,
and test how these parameters influence the impact of external debt on growth.
Our hypothesis is that, while external debt and institutional quality negatively and
positively affect growth, respectively, their interaction should have a moderating
effect on growth. In addition, as institutional quality improves, the effect of debt
on growth should be positive. We find that, as institutional quality improves, the
negative effect of debt on economic growth holds true. Specifically, we estimate
that the negative impact of external debt on growth is relevant as external debt
exceeds 46.56% of GNI. A fortiori, the accumulated external debt level needs to
be reduced to a prudent level where good institutional quality could positively
complement the effect of external debt on a country’s growth.
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Appendix
Appendix 1.
List of 53 countries
List of the countries are presented in this table. We have 53 countries.

Afghanistan

Armenia

Benin

Burkina Faso

Burundi

Bangladesh

Bhutan

Bolivia

Chad

Comoros

Congo, Dem

Cabo Verde

Cambodia

Cameroon

Congo, Rep.

Cote d’Ivoire

Guyana

Georgia

Ghana

Honduras

Gambia

Haiti

India

Kenya

Kosovo

Kyrgyz

Lao PDR

Lesotho

Madagascar

Malawi

Mali

Mozambique

Mauritania

Moldova

Mongolia

Nicaragua

Nigeria

Nepal

Niger

Pakistan

Rwanda

Senegal

Sierra Leone

Sri Lanka

Sudan

Tajikistan

St Lucia

Tanzania

Togo

Uganda

Uzbekistan

Vanuatu

Vietnam
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